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Comment
People, Places, and Fourth Amendment Protection:
The Application of Ybarra v. Illinois to Searches of
People Present During the Execution of Search
Warrants on Private Premises
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ybarra v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that
under the Fourth Amendment, police officers executing a warrant for
the search of a tavern may not search a tavern patron without either
probable cause to believe the patron possesses evidence or a rea-
sonable suspicion that the patron is armed.2 Federal and state courts
have since disagreed over whether to apply Ybarra, which involved a
search of public premises, to searches of private residences.3 In light
of the "significant practical importance" of this issue to both law en-
forcement officers and citizens, this conflict among the courts should
be resolved.4
This Comment urges that the rule of Ybarra should be applied to all
searches under warrant, regardless of whether they are conducted on
public or private premises. The Comment first reviews the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement, its exceptions, and the
Ybarra decision itself.5 Next, it examines the conflict among the
courts over whether to apply Ybarra to private premises searches. 6
This Comment then reasons that searches of visitors present on private
premises are subject to the probable cause requirement and not to one
of its exceptions.7 The Comment concludes by proposing a method of
conducting searches of private premises that comports with Ybarra
1. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
2. Id. at 90-96.
3. See infra part III.
4. Guy v. Wisconsin, 113 S. Ct. 3020, 3021 (1993) (White, J., dissenting from a de-
nial of certiorari to a case presenting this issue). For a complete discussion of Guy, see
infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra parts II.A through II.D.
6. See infra part Ill.
7. See infra part IV.
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while also promoting safe and constitutionally sound law enforce-
ment.8
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Traditional Requirement of Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that warrants for
searches or seizures issue only upon "probable cause." 9 Probable
cause to search exists where law enforcement officers reasonably
believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that they will
find evidence of the crime in the place to be searched.' ° Traditionally,
courts have viewed probable cause as an indispensable element of the
reasonableness the Fourth Amendment demands of all searches and
seizures." Because warrant-supported searches are necessarily based
upon a neutral magistrate's formal finding of probable cause, 2 they
have been preferred, in principle, to warrantless searches, 3 which are
frequently initiated upon the ad hoc determinations of perhaps
overzealous law enforcement officers. 14 Indeed, courts have long
viewed warrantless searches skeptically, 5 routinely deeming them un-
reasonable and thus unconstitutional unless supported by both
probable cause and pressing circumstances that excuse officers from
8. See infra parts V and VI.
9. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to state actions through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
10. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
11. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1(a), at 541-43 (2d ed. 1987).
The Brinegar Court characterized probable cause as a "practical, nontechnical concep-
tion affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often
opposing interests [of individual privacy and protection of the community from crime]."
338 U.S. at 176. The Dunaway Court further emphasized that probable cause is a balanc-
ing of these interests: "[T]he requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of
precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported
by probable cause." 442 U.S. at 214.
12. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.1 (Supp. 1993); see supra note 9 (setting forth the
text of the Fourth Amendment).
13. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.1 (Supp. 1993).
14. 2id.
15. 2 id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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obtaining a warrant.16 Thus all searches, whether accompanied by a
warrant or not, must as a general proposition be founded upon
probable cause to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 7
B. The Sliding Scale Alternative to Probable Cause
The Supreme Court has established exceptions to the general
proposition that reasonableness requires probable cause. These ex-
ceptions are typically based upon a sliding scale of search reasonable-
ness, rather than the traditional probable cause test of
reasonableness.18
The Supreme Court first applied this approach to a non-criminal,
administrative search in Camara v. Municipal Court.'9 In Camara, a
housing inspector conducting a routine inspection of a building
approached Camara and demanded to inspect his apartment. 20 Camara
refused to grant the inspector access without a search warrant and was
subsequently arrested for preventing an inspection in violation of a
municipal housing code.2'
In determining whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited the pro-
posed inspection, the Court somewhat curiously defined probable
cause in terms of reasonableness. 22 The Court then assessed reason-
ableness by balancing the need for the search against the personal
16. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 3.1(a), at 541-43; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (stating
that failure to obtain a warrant usually can be excused only by "exigent circumstances").
Thus, law enforcement officers may properly search an individual without a warrant
where the contraband to be seized appears in plain view on the individual's person or in
his possession. State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693, 698 (Kan. 1985). Officers may also
perform a warrantless search of an individual incident to a valid arrest, or where probable
cause to search the individual exists along with exigent circumstances. Id. The insis-
tence on probable cause for warrantless searches is based in part on the preference for
warrant-supported searches: if officers are allowed to perform warrantless searches upon
less than probable cause, they will have little reason to mount the effort needed to
obtain warrants, which may not issue unless the officers establish probable cause.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
17. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 3.1(a), at 541-43.
18. See infra notes 19-46.
19. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
20. Id. at 526.
21. Id. at 526-27.
22. Id. at 535. The Court stated that "[i]n determining whether a particular inspection
is reasonable-and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these rea-
sonable goals of code enforcement." Id. The Court's use of reasonableness to define
probable cause was thus circular since probable cause is itself traditionally used to define
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. See supra notes 9-17 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the traditional definition of reasonableness through the
use of probable cause.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
invasion the search entailed.23 Under this approach, the Court
weighed the governmental interest in discovering housing code viola-
tions through warrantless administrative inspections against the
intrusion on individual privacy caused by such inspections. 24 Because
the inspections were reasonable on a generalized level, the Court
maintained, probable cause for an administrative warrant to conduct
the individual inspections would exist if officials satisfied reasonable
administrative standards in performing them.25 The Court concluded
that Camara had a Fourth Amendment right to demand that the inspec-
tor obtain an administrative warrant to search his apartment.26 The
Court maintained that its balancing test did not nullify the probable
cause requirement, but, rather, honored the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard which has always governed intrusions on pri-
vate property.27
In Terry v. Ohio,28 the Court expanded the Camara sliding scale
approach in the context of a criminal search. The Terry sliding scale
assessed search reasonableness with a balancing test that abandoned
probable cause as a criterion of reasonableness. 29 Thus the Court
established a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement for
searches of individuals whom police officers believe to be armed and
dangerous.30
In Terry, a police officer stopped three men he believed were sur-
veying a store before robbing it.3' Concerned that the men might be
23. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. The Court stated that "there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." Id.
24. Id. at 534-37. The Court distinguished between searches made in criminal inves-
tigations, in which police officers are only authorized to recover specific evidence, and
regulatory inspections, which are made to protect public health and safety. Id. at 535,
537.
25. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
26. Id. at 540.
27. Id. at 539. One commentator, however, has stated that the Court's treatment of
the probable cause concept changed the Fourth Amendment's orientation from protect-
ing individual privacy to favoring government intrusion. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 401 (1988).
28. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. Id. at 27. The Terry Court noted that "the notions which underlie ... the require-
ment of probable cause remain fully relevant in [the] context" of evaluating searches
made for officer protection. Id. at 20. But cf. Sundby, supra note 27, at 402 n.64
(stressing that prior to Terry probable cause was "not only relevant . . . [but]
controlling").
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39 (describing the
balancing test).
3 1. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
246 [Vol. 25
1994] Private Premises Searches Under Ybarra v. Illinois 247
carrying weapons, the officer conducted a patdown of their outer
clothing and found guns on the persons of two of them.3 2 Those two
men were then charged with and convicted of carrying concealed
weapons.33 Defendant Terry challenged the conviction and contended
that admitting the guns into evidence violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. 3
4
In affirming Terry's conviction, the Court balanced the governmen-
tal interest in protecting police officers against the individual interest in
remaining free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. 35 The
Court acknowledged that even a brief patdown of a suspect's outer
clothing constitutes a severe invasion of individual privacy.36
Nevertheless, invoking the strong governmental interest in protecting
police officers, the Court held that a police officer may stop and frisk 37
a person for weapons even where the officer does not have probable
cause to arrest the person.38 Rather, officers need only demonstrate:
(1) a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual to be
searched is involved in criminal activity; and (2) a reasonable belief
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous.39
Although Terry created an exception to the probable cause require-
ment, the Court has narrowly restricted the situations in which an offi-
32. Id.
33. Id. at 7-8.
34. Id. See also id. at 5 n.2 (detailing the procedural history of the case).
35. Id. at 23-27.
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
37. The government's primary argument was that a stop-and-frisk is not a search and
seizure. Id. at 10-11. The Court stressed, however, that "it is nothing less than sheer
torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces
of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
'search."' Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The Court remarked that it would actually be unreasonable
to prohibit an officer from "neutraliz[ing] the threat of physical harm" if the officer rea-
sonably believes the suspect whom he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous. Id. at 24. One commentator has identified the following as factors
used by courts in a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether the requisite
reasonable and articulable suspicion exists: (1) the ease with which a search warrant
could have been obtained; (2) the source of the officer's information regarding the indi-
vidual to be searched; (3) the extent of the officer's experience; (4) the extent of the
officer's personal knowledge regarding the individual to be searched; (5) the type of
criminal activity in which the individual to be searched is allegedly involved; (6) the
relationship of the individual to be searched to the premises where the search occurs; (7)
the time of the stop; (8) the location of the stop; and (9) the conduct of the person to be
searched prior to the stop. Gretchen Slosser, Note, Unreasonable Suspicion: The
Minnesota Supreme Court Extends Terry to Nonsuspects Arriving at Premises Being
Searched Under Warrant: State v. Gobely, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1208, 1214-16 (1986).
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cer may conduct a Terry stop-and-frisk.4° A major limiting principle is
that Terry only authorizes searches for the protection of law enforce-
ment officers and bystanders.4 Accordingly, Terry searches must be
reasonably fashioned to uncover weapons.42 Only a limited patdown
of the individual's outer clothing is permitted, and officers may not
search pockets unless the patdown of the outer clothing indicates the
presence of a weapon.43 Further, unlike searches authorized by other
exceptions to the warrant or probable cause requirements, a Terry
search may not be used to prevent the loss or destruction of evi-
dence. 44 Terry also requires that law enforcement officers be able to
justify their protective searches by identifying with particularity the
facts that aroused their suspicion. 45 Although the Terry Court main-
tained that its exception was a narrow one, the Court's subsequent
expansive use of the balancing approach to measure the reasonableness
of police actions has led to a widespread acceptance of searches
founded upon a level of suspicion less than probable cause.46
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29; see also Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210 (stating that the Court
has been careful to preserve Terry's narrow scope).
41. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
42. Id.
43. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968). Sibron was a companion case
to Terry. The Supreme Court recently held in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130,
2139 (1993), that a law enforcement officer may seize non-threatening contraband dis-
covered during a protective Terry patdown if the search was performed within the limits
established in Terry.
44. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. The Court has also mandated Terry stops be brief in
duration. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1985).
45. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Thus, an officer's generalized suspicion of an individual is
insufficient to validate a Terry search. Id. at 27. See also Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64
(stating that officers must be able to show particular facts reasonably used to determine
that the suspect was threatening). A court may consider rational inferences drawn from
the facts surrounding a search in determining the reasonableness of officers' actions.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
46. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (applying
a balancing test to find a sobriety checkpoint lawful); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325
(1990) (holding lawful a protective sweep justified with mere reasonable suspicion based
on specific facts); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(permitting drug testing of railroad employees without a showing of any individual
suspicion of involvement in specific incidents); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987) (permitting inventory searches of autos without warrant, probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding the search
of a student's purse reasonable after applying a balancing test); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979) (requiring only reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or a
car unregistered to justify stopping the motorist); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(using a balancing test to demonstrate that prison inmates have no legitimate privacy
expectation in preventing cell searches); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (holding stops at fixed border checkpoints lawful under a balancing test); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (permitting a roving patrol to stop a
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C. Reaffirmation of the Requirement of
Probable Cause: Ybarra v. Illinois
Eleven years after Terry, the Court underscored the "narrow scope"
of the Terry exception to the probable cause requirement in Ybarra v.
Illinois.47 The Court ruled in Ybarra that officers executing a premises
search warrant violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when
they searched Ybarra without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion that Ybarra was dangerous.48
In Ybarra, police officers obtained a warrant authorizing the search
of the Aurora Tap Tavern and its bartender for evidence of possession
of controlled substances.4  Seven or eight officers entered the tavern
in the late afternoon to execute the warrant.5 ° After the officers
announced that they intended to perform a "cursory search for
weapons," one officer patted down each of the nine to thirteen patrons
present while the other officers searched the premises.5
When the officer designated to frisk the customers patted down
Ventura Ybarra,52 the officer felt what he described as a "cigarette pack
with objects in it."513 He did not then remove the object, but instead
finished frisking the other customers.5 4 The officer then returned to
Ybarra and patted him down again, at which time he retrieved the
cigarette pack from Ybarra's pants pocket.55 The officer opened the
vehicle where supported by reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained illegal
aliens).
47. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
48. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96.
49. Id. at 88. A special agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation based the
Complaint for a Search Warrant on a reliable informant's report. Id. at 87. The infor-
mant reported not only that he observed the bartender in possession of foil packets of
the type commonly used to package heroin, but also that the bartender had told him that
he planned to sell heroin on the date on which the officers executed the warrant. Id. at
87-88.
50. Id. at 88.
51. Id.
52. The officers had sufficient light to observe the patrons of the bar. Ybarra, 444
U.S. at 93. They did not recognize Ybarra as an individual with a criminal record, nor did
they have reason to believe he was dangerous. Id. One officer testified that Ybarra's
hands were empty, that Ybarra did not indicate that he possessed a weapon, and that
Ybarra made no threatening gestures. Id. The officer's only ground for suspicion was
that Ybarra was wearing a three-quarters length jacket, which the State acknowledged was
not an uncommon item of springtime clothing. Id.
53. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 89. The officer performed the second search approximately two to ten
minutes after the first. Id.
250 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 25
pack and discovered six foil packets of heroin inside. 6
On review, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of
Ybarra violated the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Court rejected the
State's argument for application of the Terry exception to the probable
cause requirement, stressing that Terry's narrow scope does not permit
a "generalized 'cursory search for weapons"' and, moreover, does not
allow a search for anything but weapons.5 8 The Court reiterated that
officers must base their Terry searches on particular facts which
support a reasonable belief that the specific individual frisked is armed
and dangerous-even when the individual is present where a search
under warrant is taking place. 9
Additionally, the Court refused to hold that persons present on
premises being searched under warrant and whom officers reasonably
believe may be trafficking in drugs always engender a Terry-type sus-
picion that they possess evidence.6° The Court reasoned that this con-
tention was foreclosed by its earlier decision in United States v. Di
Re, 6' which held that an individual's mere presence in an automobile
does not justify an otherwise illegal search of the individual's per-
son. 62 Although Di Re involved a warrantless search of automobile
56. Id. at 89. Ybarra was indicted for the unlawful possession of a controlled sub-
stance. Id. The trial court denied Ybarra's motion to suppress the contraband seized from
him at the tavern because it found the search and seizure proper under the applicable
Illinois statute. Id. The statute provided: "In the execution of [a] warrant the person
executing the same may reasonably detain to search any person in the place at the time:
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things
particularly described in the warrant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-9 (1975) (current
version at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch 725, § 5/108-9 (West 1992)). The trial court found
Ybarra guilty. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 89. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the
conviction and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra's petition for leave to appeal.
Id. (citing People v. Ybarra, 373 N.E.2d 1013 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978)).
57. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-93, 96. Although the question of whether Ybarra had
standing to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim was not before the Court, the majority
expressly stated that the patrons present in the tavern were entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. Id. at 91. A person has Fourth Amendment standing if he or she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 138-40 (1978). The Court did not reach the question of whether seizing the contra-
band from Ybarra's pocket would have been lawful, since it held that the search of Ybarra
itself was unlawful. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 n.5. The Court recently held that seizing
contraband does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the search that precedes the seizure
satisfies Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). See supra note 43 for
a brief discussion of Dickerson.
5 8. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-94.
59. Id. at 94.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
62. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587. The Di Re Court declined to address whether the car itself
could have been lawfully searched. Id. at 585-86.
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occupants rather than a warrant-supported search of a tavern, the
Ybarra Court observed the principle expressed in Di Re that an
individual does not forfeit Fourth Amendment protection by virtue of
presence in a closed area that is subject to a lawful search. 63 The
Ybarra Court thus concluded that the State could not justify the search
of Ybarra solely by his presence in the tavern.'
Because it had determined that the search of Ybarra did not fall
under the Terry exception, the Ybarra Court required probable cause
particular to Ybarra to justify the search of his person.65 The Court
reasoned that neither probable cause to search or seize one individual,
nor probable cause to search the premises where that individual is pre-
sent, can, by itself, constitute probable cause to search another
individual.66 Upon concluding that the State could not demonstrate
probable cause to search Ybarra himself, the Court ruled that the
search of Ybarra had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches.67
In dissent, Justice Burger took the position that the reasonableness
of a search should be determined with a sliding scale that balances the
degree of intrusion into individual privacy against the justification for
the intrusion.68 Justice Burger viewed the search of Ybarra as reason-
able under this test. 69 He maintained that the Terry rationale legit-
imized a general search in Ybarra because of the acute law enforcement
safety interest raised by the location of the search.7° Specifically, he
asserted that when searching a compact room that is a possible setting
63. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 95. In fact, the Ybarra Court quoted the government's conces-
sion in Di Re that it could not search all persons present in a home where it had obtained
a search warrant for the home. Id. at 95 n.9 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587).
64. Id. at 95-96.
65. Id. at 92-94. The Court reasoned that probable cause historically represents the
best available balance of governmental and individual interests. Id. at 95. In response
to the government's argument that the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion should
suffice to allow "evidence" searches of individuals present on "compact" premises
subject to warrant, the Court stated:
The "long-prevailing" constitutional standard of probable cause embodies
"'the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often
opposing interests' in 'safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable in-
terferences with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the
law in the community's protection."'
Id. at 95-96 (citing Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176)).
66. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 95-96.
67. Id. at 90-93, 96.
68. Id. at 97 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion. Id. at 96.
69. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 98 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 97 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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for narcotics trafficking, officers may have bona fide cause to believe
their safety is so endangered as to necessitate a search of persons pre-
sent in the room.7
In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the core
issue was the proper scope of police power under a search warrant.72
He asserted that the search of Ybarra was permissible under Terry
even without a showing of individualized suspicion.73 He reasoned
that individualized suspicion is unnecessary where: (1) a neutral mag-
istrate has found a search of the premises necessary, which obviates
the need for individualized suspicion to prevent arbitrary police action;
and (2) a small but potentially dangerous group is present.74 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that literally applying Terry's individualized
suspicion requirement, which was fashioned in response to a warrant-
less and on-street stop-and-frisk, to a case involving the execution of a
closed premises search warrant would not assess reasonableness based
on the totality of the circumstances, as Terry dictates.
Notwithstanding the Court's subsequent use of the balancing test
recommended by Justice Rehnquist in Ybarra,76 Ybarra stands as a
reaffirmation of the viability of the traditional approach of treating
probable cause as an absolute criterion of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.
71. Id. at 97-98 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist main-
tained that the officer's actions in Ybarra were objectively reasonable, whatever the offi-
cer's level of suspicion. Id. at 109. He acknowledged that the objective reasonableness
of a search will depend on the circumstances of the case: "[lit might well not be reason-
able to search 350 people on the first floor of Marshall Field [department store], but
we're talking about, by description, a rather small tavern." Id. (quoting the Ybarra trial
court).
74. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that
the Court need not have measured the reasonableness of the search against the "jealously
drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Since the second clause of the Fourth Amendment does not require that warrants specify
the "persons" to be searched, Justice Rehnquist found the warrant requirement fully
satisfied in Ybarra. Id. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that
in a search of private premises, the officers are close to the individuals present for a
longer period than was the officer in Terry and must direct their attention to the search of
the premises rather than the activities of the individuals. Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.9, at 150-51 (1st ed. 1978)). Quoting the Second Circuit, Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that among narcotics dealers, "'firearms are as much "tools of the
trade" as are most commonly recognized articles of narcotics paraphernalia."' Ybarra,
444 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d
45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)).
7 6. See supra note 46.
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D. Michigan v. Summers: Sliding Scale Justification for the
Detention of Owners and Occupants of Private Premises
Despite the Ybarra Court's rejection of the use of the sliding scale
approach to justify the search of persons on public premises, in
Michigan v. Summers77 the Court used a balancing test of reasonable-
ness to determine whether the temporary detention of the owner or
occupant of a residence being searched under warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment.78 Applying that test, the Court rejected
Summers's claim that his pre-arrest detention during the search of his
residence violated the prohibition against unreasonable seizures. 79 The
Court did not address, however, whether the warrant for the search of
Summers's residence authorized the officers to search persons they
found within the residence.8" Indeed, the Court stated in a footnote
that the issue raised in Summers differed from the issue raised in
Ybarra: in Summers, the seizure of a person, rather than the search of
a person, was at issue.81
As in Terry, the Summers Court used a balancing test to assess the
reasonableness of Summers's seizure.8 2 The Court cited Terry,
Adams v. Williams,83 and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce84 to
support its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness re-
quirement permits some seizures constituting limited intrusions on
individual privacy where substantial law enforcement interests are at
77. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
78. Id. at 699-705. In Summers, police officers obtained a warrant to search a private
residence for narcotics. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. When they arrived at the house,
they detained Summers, the owner of the house, while they executed the search warrant.
Id. Upon discovering narcotics in the basement, the officers arrested Summers. Id.
They discovered additional drugs when they searched his person. Id. The state charged
Summers with possession of the drugs found on his person. Id. at 694. Although
Summers involved a seizure rather than a search, it is relevant to the present discussion
because some courts have extended its holding to justify searches of owners and
occupants present on private premises during the execution of a search warrant. See
infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
79. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
80. Id. at 695.
81. Id. at 695 n.4. Under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), police may
search an arrestee's person for evidence or weapons.
82. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700 & n.12.
83. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams, the Court ruled that the removal of a gun from
the waistband of a defendant sitting in a car constituted a reasonable seizure even though
the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time. Id. at 147-48.
84. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held that an officer may
briefly stop a vehicle to question the driver and passengers regarding their citizenship if
the stop is supported by a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.
Id. at 881-82.
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stake. 5 Under this balancing approach, the Court stressed, officers
may seize an individual based on less than probable cause if they can
show an "articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity."86
The Summers Court began its balancing exercise by evaluating the
scope of the intrusion on Summers's privacy. 87 The Court reasoned
that the fact that the officers had obtained a search warrant for the
premises was "[o]f prime importance," in that a "neutral and detached
magistrate" had authorized the invasion of Summers's privacy upon a
finding of probable cause that a criminal offense had occurred in his
residence. 8 The Court also allowed that police may base their suspi-
cion of an individual on the connection between that person and his or
her residence. 9 In light of these circumstances, the Court reasoned
that the detention of an occupant constitutes a lesser personal intrusion
than does the search of his or her residence. 90
85. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700. In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, criticized the majority's expansion of Terry, Adams, and
Brignoni-Ponce to allow a seizure not supported by probable cause. Id. at 706 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Stewart maintained that these cases represent special exceptions
to the general requirement of probable cause, rather than a broad authorization for the
Court to gauge reasonableness through a balancing test. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Summers, unlike Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce, failed to present special govern-
mental interests other than the usual law enforcement interest in investigating crimes
and catching criminals, which were sufficiently important to override the general
probable cause requirement. Id. at 706-08 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart con-
cluded that "the government must demonstrate an important purpose beyond the normal
goals of criminal investigation, or must demonstrate an extraordinary obstacle to such
investigation" to justify a seizure unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 708 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
86. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699.
87. Id. at 701.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 703-04.
90. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. The Court also observed that an occupant of a resi-
dence being searched will most likely prefer to remain on the premises to observe the
search, unless he or she wants to avoid arrest. Id. Moreover, because officers will likely
obtain the evidence they seek through the search rather than through the occupant's
detention, officers executing the warrant will be unlikely to exploit or unreasonably
prolong the detention. Id.
The majority further urged that the type of detention at issue in Summers was less
intrusive than other types of seizures, such as an arrest or removal to a police station for
interrogation. Id. at 702. The Court compared the circumstances of Summers's seizure
with the seizure of the defendant in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
Summers, 452 U.S. at 696-98, 702. In Dunaway, the Court held that officers illegally
seized a defendant when they took him into custody at a neighbor's house and then
removed him to the police station for interrogation. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203. The
Summers Court stated that compared to the seizure in Dunaway, the detention of Summers
in his own home "add[ed] only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search
itself and ...involve[d] neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a
compelled visit to the police station." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. In dissent, Justice
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Turning to the law enforcement interest in Summers's seizure, the
Court examined both the interest promoted by the seizure and the
"articulable facts" supporting it.91 The Court found that the law en-
forcement interests promoted by detaining the occupant of a private
residence while executing a search warrant include preventing flight,
minimizing the risk of harm to the police and others present on the
premises, and facilitating the search.92 The Court also reasoned that
the combination of a search warrant based on probable cause and the
relationship between an occupant and the premises to be searched
provides sufficient articulable facts to support a detention.93 After bal-
ancing the intrusion suffered by Summers against the law enforcement
interests advanced by his detention, the Court held the detention was
reasonable because a search warrant for illegal drugs based on
probable cause "implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."94
III. DISCUSSION
Since Ybarra, federal and state courts have disagreed over whether
Ybarra's probable cause requirement should be applied to searches of
persons present during warrant-supported searches of private resi-
dences. 95 Some courts apply Ybarra to all cases involving searches of
Stewart criticized the majority's conclusion that Summers's detention was limited and
unintrusive. Id. at 710-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart asserted that under
the majority holding, "[t]he police ... [may] make the person a prisoner in his own
home for a potentially very long period of time" because the majority authorizes a deten-
tion that "can be as long as the police find it necessary to protract the search." Id. at
711-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
92. Id. at 702-03.
93. Id. at 703-04.
94. Id. at 705. The Court stated that its holding that the officers in Summers could
detain the occupant of the premises they were searching under warrant does not "preclude
the possibility that comparable police conduct may be justified by exigent circum-
stances in the absence of a warrant." Id. at 702 n.17. Summers implies that the Court
would not permit the detention of non-occupants without the demonstration of other
compelling governmental interests, such as the need for a protective Terry stop. See
Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05 (stressing importance of connection of occupant to
home); see also Slosser, supra note 39, at 1217 (stating that Terry requirements must be
fulfilled as to non-occupants). See also Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (stating that Summers cannot be extended to a non-occupant to justify
a search without first satisfying Ybarra's standards); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.9(e),
at 309-10 (stating that the word "occupant," as used by the Court in Summers, must be
interpreted literally to include only occupants or residents, rather than to cover anyone
present).
95. For a discussion of similarly inconsistent applications of Ybarra in cases involv-
ing office searches and seizures, see Jeffrey D. Winter, Comment, Pondering the Scope
255
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bystanders incident to the execution of a search warrant.96 These
courts deem searches of bystanders without either a warrant or
probable cause unreasonable, regardless of the public or private char-
acter of the site of the search. 97 Other courts distinguish the public
place search in Ybarra from searches of private residences, maintaining
that searches of bystanders present on private premises may pass
constitutional muster under a balancing test.98 Still other courts extend
the Summers holding99 to validate searches of the owners or occupants
of private residences searched under warrant."° Each of these views
is discussed below.
of Premises Search Warrants After Ybarra v. Illinois, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 661 (1989).
96. See, e.g., Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Clay, 640 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sporleder, 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir.
1980); White v. United States, 512 A.2d 283 (D.C. 1986); People v. Gross, 465 N.E.2d
119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693 (Kan. 1985); State v. Coons,
627 A.2d 1064 (N.H. 1993); Bell v. State, 608 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. 1980); State v.
Weber, 668 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982); see also United States v.
Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1304 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasizing that the court does "not
countenance the search of any individual who happens to be no more than on the
premises where a narcotics warrant is being executed"); United States v. Vaughan, 718
F.2d 332, 335 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983) (agreeing Ybarra should be applied to searches
although not to detentions); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986) (explaining
"that a person's mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that person").
97. See supra note 96.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v.
Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); People v. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Harris, 384 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Zearley, 444
N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1989); State v. Alamont, 577 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1990); State v. Guy,
492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992); see also People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Colo.
1989) (distinguishing Ybarra because in Ybarra the police conducted a search on all
individuals present on public premises); State v. Beals, 410 So. 2d 745, 748-49 (La.
1982) (involving an occupant of a residence and not a bystander); People v. Coleman,
461 N.W.2d 615 (Mich. 1990) (dicta); State v. Ferrell, 266 S.E.2d 869, 871 (S.C. 1980)
(justifying a search as incident to arrest although lacking particularized probable cause).
When determining the applicability of Ybarra, some courts also distinguish between
cases involving persons already present on the premises when the officers arrive and
persons who arrive during the execution of the search warrant. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note
11, §4.9(c) at 295. Some courts require that for a search to satisfy Ybarra, the individual
searched must have had the opportunity to conceal items on the premises before the
warrant is executed. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, §4.9(c) at 295. Therefore, these courts
generally do not allow searches of persons arriving on the premises after the arrival of
the officers. Id. Professor LaFave has criticized courts that allow searches of late
arrivals, except where the search warrant authorizes a search for goods that are part of an
ongoing criminal activity. Id.
99. See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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A. Ybarra Followed. Probable Cause Required
Courts that apply Ybarra to searches of both private and public
premises measure search reasonableness solely by the presence or
absence of probable cause, rather than with a sliding scale approach.'0 '
These courts decline to distinguish between the public nature of the
premises searched in Ybarra and private premises.0 2
For example, in State v. Broadnax, 03 the Washington Supreme
Court applied Ybarra's probable cause requirement to the search of an
individual present on private premises during the execution of a search
warrant.' °4 The court emphasized the narrow scope of the exceptions
to the probable cause requirement, as typified by the Terry excep-
tion.0 5 Applying Ybarra, the court found that petitioner Thompson's
mere presence at a private residence during a search was insufficient to
justify the frisk of his person.'0 6
The Broadnax court stated that even the officers' reasonable belief
that narcotics trafficking was occurring on the premises and that per-
101. See, e.g., White v. United States, 512 A.2d 283, 286 (D.C. 1986) (stating that
appellant's presence in a private home did not give police probable cause to believe he
was committing a crime).
102. See, e.g., State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1982) (describing the
distinction between private and public as "fallacious"). Typically, cases following this
approach cite Justice Stewart's admonition in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967), that the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places. E.g., Lippert v.
State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
103. 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982).
104. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 101. In Broadnax, a narcotics detective obtained a war-
rant authorizing the search of a private residence. Id. at 98. Although the warrant did
not authorize the search of any persons, the supporting affidavit stated that the detective
had information that a "male known as Clifford," who lived at the residence, had offered
narcotics for sale within the previous day. Id. Four police officers went to the residence
to execute the warrant; three entered the house, and one remained outside. Id. at 98-99.
The three officers who entered the house instructed Clifford Broadnax, a resident of the
house, and petitioner Thompson "to put their hands on their heads." Id. at 99. The
fourth officer, Detective Buckland, who had been standing guard outside, then entered the
house. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 99. When Buckland saw the two men with their hands on
their heads, Buckland assumed Thompson was under arrest and asked if Thompson should
be searched. Id. Another officer responded that Thompson had not been frisked. Id.
Although neither of the officers indicated that they suspected Thompson was armed,
Detective Buckland frisked Thompson. Id. During the patdown, Buckland felt a small
bulge in Thompson's shirt pocket. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 99. Although Buckland did
not believe the object was a weapon, he removed it from Thompson's pocket; he discov-
ered the bulge was a balloon containing heroin. Id. Thompson was charged with
possession of heroin and found guilty after the trial court denied his motion to suppress
the evidence. Id. at 98.
105. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 99-100. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text
for discussion of the Terry exception.
106. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 100-01.
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sons present in the house could conceal or remove contraband did not
justify searching Thompson. °7 The court rejected the lower court's
distinction between the public premises searched in Ybarra and the pri-
vate premises searched in Broadnax as "fallacious," stating that such a
distinction ignores Ybarra's teachings.'0 8 Noting the Ybarra Court's
observation that persons possess constitutional protection individually,
the court deduced that this protection prohibits frisking individuals
.without probable cause, unless a reasonable suspicion exists that the
specific person to be searched is armed and dangerous.' °9 The court
concluded that because the officer searched Thompson for contraband
without a warrant, probable cause, or any belief that he was armed, the
search was impermissible. "0
107. Id. at 105. In Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), the
court observed that the police may establish individualized probable cause (1) when the
person to be searched makes furtive gestures or attempts to flee the premises; (2) when
the person to be searched has a prior criminal record of which the police officers are
aware at the time of the search; or (3) when there is a nexus between the person to be
searched and contraband on the premises. See Lippert, 664 S.W.2d at 721 (discussed
infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text). Professor LaFave has commented that dur-
ing the search of private premises under warrant, probable cause will most likely be
found if the person to be searched is the resident of the premises, is engaged in suspi-
cious conduct, or is found in immediate proximity to contraband in plain view. 2
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.9(c) at 296. Yet these circumstances do not provide
probable cause to search an individual when the items listed in the search warrant cannot
be concealed on the individual's person because of size or other factors. 2 Id. at 295.
108. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 101. See also Slosser, supra note 39, at 1233-34 n.178
(stating that the public nature of the premises was not a factor in the Ybarra decision; the
Ybarra frisk was found unconstitutional because there were no reasonable grounds to
believe that Ybarra was armed and dangerous).
109. Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 101. This individualized suspicion can be established by
an individual moving suddenly toward a pocket. United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157,
160' (8th Cir. 1981). The reasonable belief required by Terry must arise prior to the
search, rather than as a product of it. United States v. Sporleder, 635 F.2d 809, 814
(10th Cir. 1980). The Broadnax court also cited Supreme Court decisions which
acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment more affirmatively recognizes the zone of
privacy in an individual's home, since this zone "'finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms."' Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 104 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 589 (1980)).
110. Id. at 101. Citing Ybarra's declaration that Terry cannot be read to allow a
search for anything except weapons, the Broadnax court stated:
We are aware of no instance in which the [United States] Supreme Court has
condoned the use of a "frisk" to search for evidence of an independent crime.
All of its pronouncements have made it clear that such a warrantless personal
intrusion is justified only to assure the safety of the officer and others.
Broadnax, 694 P.2d at 101 (quoting State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (Wash. 1980)
(footnote omitted)). Even assuming the legality of the frisk, the officer could not
remove an object from Thompson's person unless he believed it was a weapon: "[O]nce
it is ascertained that no weapon is involved, the government's limited authority to
invade the individual's right to be free of police intrusion is spent." Broadnax, 694 P.2d
at 101 (quoting State v. Allen, 606 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Wash. 1980)) (citations and
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Applying a test similar to the probable cause test used in Broadnax,
a Texas appellate court ruled in Lippert v. State... that appellant
Lippert's mere presence in a house when officers executed a search
warrant, without more, did not justify a frisk of Lippert." l2 The
Lippert court first determined that the warrant to search the residence
did not authorize Lippert's arrest." 13 It then reasoned that discovery of
evidence in a house during the execution of a warrant is insufficient to
establish probable cause to arrest everyone present." 4 The court
explained that regardless of the setting of a search, Ybarra made clear
that a person possesses constitutional protections individually." 5
Accordingly, the Lippert court concluded that due to the lack of a war-
rant, probable cause, or a basis for reasonable suspicion that Lippert
was armed and dangerous, the frisk of Lippert was unreasonable and
thus unconstitutional. 16
B. Ybarra Distinguished: Sliding Scale Analysis Applied
Courts that authorize searches of individuals based on their mere
presence on private premises being searched under warrant distinguish
private premises searches from the public premises search in Ybarra.
emphasis omitted).
111. 664 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
112. Id. at 721-22. In Lippert, a police officer obtained a warrant to search a private
residence and to arrest and search persons named in the affidavit. Id. at 714.
Subsequently, the officer and two deputy sheriffs went to the residence to execute the
warrant. Id. at 714-15. Approximately fifteen minutes after the officers began to search
the house, one officer discovered Lippert, who had either arrived at the house after the
officers began to execute the warrant or had been hiding in the house during the search.
Id. at 715. The officer immediately frisked Lippert for weapons, but found neither
weapons nor narcotics. Lippert, 664 S.W.2d at 715. Later, before the officers placed
Lippert in the squad car to take him to the police station, an officer searched him again
for weapons. Id. The officer discovered a case containing methamphetamine in
Lippert's shirt pocket. Id. at 715-16. After the trial court overruled Lippert's motion to
suppress, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. Id. at 714.
113. Lippert, 664 S.W.2d at 716. The warrant authorized the arrest and search of per-
sons in control of the premises, who were named as follows in the supporting affidavit:
"Sherry Fourtner, and Mike (last name unknown-but sound is phonetically similar to
'Euling'), and person or persons whose names, identities and descriptions are unknown
to affiant." Id. at 714. The trial court record indicated that Lippert was not in control of
the premises. Id. at 716. Moreover, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the
appellate court finding that the warrant only authorized the arrest of persons named in
the affidavit, rather than all persons found on the premises. Id.
114. Id. at 722.
115. Lippert, 664 S.W.2d at 718. In stating that the setting of the search is irrele-
vant to determining the extent of constitutional protection of individuals, the court
stated that "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect persons, not places." Id.
116. Id. at 721-22.
260 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 25
These courts evaluate the reasonableness of private premises searches
with a sliding scale approach, rather than a probable cause test.
In People v. Thurman, " 7 a California appellate court balanced the
governmental interest in a search of an individual present on private
premises against the extent of the resultant intrusion on individual
privacy.' 8 Since the court determined that the governmental interest
significantly outweighed the personal intrusion, the court deemed the
search lawful even though it was made without probable cause. " 9 The
court viewed Ybarra as inapplicable to searches on private premises for
three reasons. 2 ° First, an individual present in a residence where nar-
cotics transactions are taking place is likely to be involved in drug
trafficking, inasmuch as private residences do not attract visitors off
the street as do public taverns.' 2' Second, private surroundings are
generally more dangerous than public locations, such as taverns. 22
Finally, suspected narcotics traffickers found in a residence are more
likely to be armed than are customers in a tavern. 23
Instead of requiring probable cause as in Ybarra, the Thurman court
applied a balancing test similar to the one applied in Terry and the test
Justice Burger advocated in his Ybarra dissent. 24  The court thus
117. 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
118. Id. at 520. In Thurman, police officers obtained a warrant to search a private
apartment for drugs, narcotics paraphernalia, and various documents. Id. at 518. When
the officers entered the apartment, they found Thurman sitting quietly and passively on a
sofa. Id. Although the officers realized that the warrant did not authorize a search of
Thurman, one of the officers patted him down for weapons. Id. During the frisk, the
officer felt a large object in Thurman's jacket pocket which he believed was a weapon.
Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 518. The officer then reached into the pocket, felt the
object, and realized it was not a weapon. Id. Believing the object to be a plastic bag
filled with rock cocaine, the officer removed the object; he discovered that the object
was a plastic bag containing twelve large rocks of cocaine. Id. After the trial court
denied his motion to suppress, Thurman pled guilty to one count of possession of
cocaine for sale. Id.
119. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 520, 522.
120. Id. at 520-21.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 521. The court stated that the risk involved in this
type of search "corresponds to, if not exceeds, ' . . . the inordinate risk confronting an
officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile."' Id. at 520 (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)). But see Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth Amendment recognizes no distinctions
among types of crimes).
124. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 520. See supra notes 28-46 (discussing the test
applied in Terry) and 68-72 (discussing Justice Burger's test) and accompanying text.
The Thurman court observed that there is "'no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the
search [or seizure] entails."' Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
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assessed the reasonableness of the officer's actions by weighing the
extent of the intrusion on the individual searched against the safety
concerns of law enforcement officials.1 25 The court characterized the
search of a person present on private premises during the execution of
a search warrant as brief and relatively private.126 It found this intru-
sion insignificant compared to police officers' need to protect them-
selves from potentially armed narcotics traffickers. 27 Accordingly,
the Thurman court concluded that law enforcement officers may
lawfully perform a Terry-type weapons frisk of persons present in a
private residence during a search for narcotics under warrant.
28
Following the Thurman court's reasoning, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in State v. Guy, ' 29 upheld the search of a person on private
premises on the ground that Ybarra does not apply to private premises
searches. 3 ' Using a Terry-type balancing test of reasonableness, the
21).
125. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 520. The court stated that conducting a protective
search in such circumstances is "manifestly reasonable," even if the individual to be
searched does not appear threatening at the moment. Jd. It would be "utter folly,"
observed the court, to require an officer to wait until the individual became overtly hos-
tile before taking protective action. Id. Professor LaFave appears sympathetic to this
reasoning:
It is likely ... that Ybarra will not be the last word on this issue. The major-
ity, after all, only required adherence to the Terry reasonable suspicion for-
mula, and did not say that assessment of the reasonableness of the suspicion
may never take into account the facts attending a particular search warrant exe-
cution which properly bear upon the magnitude of the danger to the police if
those present are armed. Moreover, the facts of Ybarra hardly made it an
especially compelling case for establishing the unique dangers which often
attend warrant execution: the search warrant was executed by a contingent of
eight police officers in a public place where drugs were apparently being sold
retail in limited amounts.
2 LAFAVE, supra note I1, § 4.9(d) at 302 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
129. 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
130. Id. at 316. In Guy, a detective obtained a warrant to search a single-family home
for cocaine, scales, other indicia of narcotics trafficking crimes, and a man identified as
"John Doe." Id. at 312. The next day, ten to fifteen police officers entered the house to
execute the warrant. Id. The officers took the persons present in the house, including
Guy, a woman not named in the warrant, to the front porch and handcuffed them. Id. An
officer then frisked Guy even though Guy stood motionless and did not appear armed.
Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 312-13. The officer felt a bulge in Guy's front pants pocket and
asked Guy what the object was. Id. When Guy replied, "[flind out for yourself," the offi-
cer removed a plastic bag containing eleven paper "bindles" of cocaine. Id. After the
trial court denied her motion to suppress the evidence, Guy was convicted of possessing
cocaine with intent to deliver. Id. The Guy court did not address the legality of the
search for contraband in this case, but only the legality of the initial frisk for weapons.
In dissent, Justice Heffeman noted that "the United States Supreme Court clearly distin-
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Guy court noted that a neutral magistrate had already determined that
the officers had probable cause to search the house, thereby supplying
the reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity required by
Terry.13' The court then emphasized the risk involved in executing a
warrant to search for narcotics and the danger involved in law en-
forcement work generally. 32 The court viewed the searching officer's
suspicion that Guy was armed as reasonable, based not upon a
suspicion particular to Guy, but on the officer's personal experience
regarding the violence associated with narcotics trafficking and the rea-
sonable inferences the officer could have drawn from the facts
surrounding the search.' 33
Although it found the search of Guy constitutional, the court
cautioned that its decision did not categorically legitimize searches of
all persons present during the execution of a search warrant. 134
Rather, the court stated, it would determine the constitutionality of
future searches according to the facts of each case.'35
C. The Extension of Michigan v. Summers to
Searches of Owners and Occupants
Some courts have relied on Michigan v. Summers'36 to justify the
guishes between the probable cause necessary to initiate a search for contraband and the
reasonable suspicion needed to support a limited self-protective search for weapons."
Id. at 318 (Heffernan, C. J., dissenting).
131. Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 313-16.
132. Id. The court noted that the danger involved in law enforcement has increased
since Terry. Id. Courts have occasionally considered the apparent size of a drug
transaction as a factor in determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop. For instance,
in United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit relied
on the fact that a defendant stopped under Terry was a major drug dealer in determining
the reasonableness of the stop. In contrast, the Guy court declined to consider that the
case before it involved a minor drug dealer. Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 316. Instead, the court
stated that requiring police officers to distinguish between major and insignificant drug
deals in evaluating whether grounds for a Terry frisk exist would inhibit flexibility in
law enforcement, would be impractical, and might unreasonably endanger officers. Id.
133. Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 316. The State argued that in determining whether the offi-
cer had a reasonable suspicion that Guy was armed, the court could also impute the
knowledge within "the collective mind of the police force" to the officer. Id. at 315.
This collective knowledge could include knowledge gained in the experience of the
detective who had obtained the warrant and who found weapons in most cases in which
he executed search warrants for drugs. Id. at 314-15. The court disregarded this notion,
concluding that the facts known to the officer when she conducted the search and the
inferences she could draw from the facts sufficed to support a conclusion that the officer
reasonably suspected Guy was armed. Id. at 315.
134. Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 316.
135. Id. The Guy court did not indicate, however, what type of facts would cause a
search on private premises to be unconstitutional.
136. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). For a discussion of Summers, see supra notes 77-94 and
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search of the owner or occupant of private premises being searched
under warrant. 31  For instance, in State v. Beals 38 the Louisiana
Supreme Court concluded that Summers authorizes the search of an
individual's person where a warrant for searching that person's resi-
dence is based on probable cause information that he or she has
committed a crime in the residence. 39 Relying on the Summers rea-
soning that a magistrate-issued warrant that authorizes a substantial
intrusion into an occupant's home justifies the lesser intrusion of
detaining the occupant, the Beals court held that a warrant authorizing
the search of a private residence based on probable cause that an occu-
pant has engaged in illegal activities on the premises also authorizes the
lesser intrusion of a search of the occupant's person."
In asserting that its decision was not inconsistent with Ybarra, the
Beals court distinguished Ybarra on the ground that the search warrant
in that case did not mention the customers of the tavern, much less
allege that customers had been observed purchasing drugs.' 4' The
court noted that in contrast, the officers in Beals based their search
warrant application on knowledge that an occupant of the premises to
be searched had been observed participating in a drug transaction on
the premises, and that Beals had a special connection with the premises
accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., State v. Beals, 410 So. 2d 745, 748 (La. 1982) (holding search of res-
ident permissible under Michigan v. Summers). But see Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 103
(stating that, although occupant may be seized under Summers, search of occupant must
satisfy Ybarra standards); Lippert, 664 S.W.2d at 720 (approvingly citing the Broadnax
reasoning regarding this issue).
138. 410 So. 2d 745 (La. 1982).
139. Beals, 410 So. 2d at 749. In Beals, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant
that authorized the search of a private residence for controlled substances. Id. at 747.
The officers based the warrant on an application which stated that an informant had
observed an occupant of the residence participating in a drug transaction on the
premises. Id. at 748. When the officers entered the house, they searched resident Beals
and discovered a package containing Dilaudid tablets on her person. Id. at 747. Beals
was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Id. at 746. The trial
court denied Beals's motion to suppress the evidence and found her guilty of the posses-
sion charge. Id.
140. Beals, 410 So. 2d at 748.
141. Id. The Ybarra Court stated:
There is no reason to suppose that, when the search warrant was issued on
March 1, 1976, the authorities had probable cause to believe that any person
found on the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern, aside from [the bartender]
would be violating the law. The search warrant complaint did not allege that
the bar was frequented by persons illegally purchasing drugs. It did not state
that the informant had ever seen a patron of the tavern purchase drugs from
[the bartender] or from any other person. Nowhere, in fact, did the complaint
even mention the patrons of the Aurora Tap Tavern.
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90 (footnote omitted).
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as a resident. 42  The court reasoned that although the Fourth
Amendment protects the legitimate privacy expectations of persons
rather than places,' 43 "[i]t is equally true that crimes are committed by
persons, not places."' 44 Therefore, the court concluded, a warrant for
the search of a residence that is based on probable cause information
that the occupant of the residence has committed a crime on the
premises authorizes the search of the occupant's person. 145
IV. ANALYSIS
Courts that allow law enforcement officers to search an individual
with no justification other than the individual's presence on private
premises contravene the principles established in Ybarra. These courts
improperly apply a Terry-type balancing test to determine the reason-
ableness of searches of persons present during the execution of a
warrant for the search of private premises.' 46 As with any other search
not within an established exception to the general requirement of prob-
able cause, reviewing courts must make particularized probable cause
an essential criterion of reasonableness for searches of private
premises. 47 The alternative test of reasonableness, the balancing test,
invariably compromises individual privacy rights in favor of
promoting governmental interests.
48
142. Beals, 410 So. 2d at 748.
143. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (cited in Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91).
144. Beals, 410 So. 2d at 749.
145. Id.
146. The sliding scale approach used by Thurman and Guy, discussed supra notes 117-
35 and accompanying text, exemplifies this improper bypassing of the probable cause
requirement.
147. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. The traditional probable cause
approach used in Broadnax and Lippert, discussed supra notes 103-116 and accompany-
ing text, best evaluates the reasonableness of police action. One observer has noted
that under Terry, individuals might threaten officers' safety merely because of their pres-
ence in a certain group or at a certain location. Thomas A. Kiriakos, Comment, Fourth
Amendment Rights of Persons Present When a Search Warrant is Executed: Ybarra v.
Illinois, 66 IOwA L. REV. 453, 461 (1981). Kiriakos disagrees with the Ybarra dissent's
position, discussed supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text, that a presumptive threat
existed in Ybarra merely because Ybarra was present in a location where controlled sub-
stances had been sold. Id. at 461-62. Kiriakos argues that no such presumption existed
in Ybarra because: (1) the bartender was only suspected of participating in a minor drug
deal; (2) the search of the tavern took place during the day; and (3) the warrant did not
indicate that the bartender or customers would be armed or that the customers would be
hostile to law enforcement officers. Id.
148. One commentator has stated that the Court's broad reasonableness standard and
"ill-defined" balancing test set forth in Camara and Terry have "significantly undermined
the role of probable cause and set the stage for the long-term expansion of the reason-
ableness balancing test without proper justification or limits." Sundby, supra note 27,
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Since the introduction of the sliding scale in Camara and its
expansion in Terry, the Court has frequently measured Fourth
Amendment reasonableness with a sliding scale instead of the tradi-
tional probable cause test. 149 Yet this trend does not entitle lower
courts to abandon probable cause-a constitutionally expressed and
traditional reasonableness criterion' 5 -- in favor of applying their own
balancing test of reasonableness to searches of ersons present during
execution of private premises search warrants.'
Arguably, a balancing test might better account for the threat to
officer safety posed by private premises searches, which may be
greater than that posed by the public premises search in Ybarra. Still,
the fact remains that the Ybarra Court, when reviewing a search of a
person whose only link to premises targeted by a warrant was his mere
presence, refused to forego the probable cause requirement in favor of
a balancing test.'5 2 If probable cause is the standard by which the rea-
sonableness of Ybarra searches must be measured, probable cause
should similarly be the standard by which the reasonableness of
searches of persons present on private premises should be measured,
regardless of the relative weight of the governmental interest involved.
In sum, despite the Court's now-pervasive use of the sliding scale
approach to assessing search reasonableness,'53 Ybarra remains a
strong example of the limits on using that approach to evaluate
searches purportedly justified by a person's mere presence at the scene
of a premises search.154
at 385. According to Sundby, "the definition of a reasonable search or seizure should be
sufficiently stringent to preclude the temptation to undervalue privacy rights in
comparison to important government objectives." Id.
149. For a list of post-Terry cases using the sliding scale approach, see supra note
46.
150. See supra part II.A.
15 1. Using a balancing test to determine reasonableness presents serious problems.
First, it ignores the Fourth Amendment's second clause, which requires warrants based on
probable cause. Second, it produces uncertainty by removing warrant and probable cause
requirements as limits on police activity. Finally, it forces the Court to evaluate each
government intrusion on an ad hoc basis. Sundby, supra note 27, at 417. The sliding
scale approach "ultimately threatens privacy protections by taking away the amend-
ment's sole restraint on the Court's definition of reasonableness-a warrant based on
probable cause." Id. If not restrained, this approach thus risks becoming "one immense
Rorschach blot." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 393 (1974).
152. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94-96.
153. See supra note 46.
154. Recall the Ybarra Court's admonition that "[tihe 'long-prevailing' constitu-
tional standard of probable cause embodies 'the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating [the] often opposing interests' in 'safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforc-
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As for protective frisks during private premises searches, allowing
them without individualized suspicion improperly extends the princi-
ples established in Terry. 55 As the Ybarra Court firmly stated, Terry
does not allow a search for weapons without a reasonable suspicion
that the specific person to be frisked is armed and dangerous-even
when police encounter the person during an authorized premises
search for narcotics. 56 Consequently, courts may not justify protec-
tive searches of individuals on private premises based on threats
perceived to be inherent in investigations of drug trafficking or other
crimes typically perpetrated by violent people. 57
Nor should any exception to the general rule requiring particularized
probable cause be made for searches of individuals who occupy
premises searched under warrant. Summers merely provides that an
occupant may be detained during the execution of a warrant for the
search of the premises; it specifically does not address whether such a
warrant also authorizes searching the person of the occupant or any
other individual present on the premises. 58 Indeed, the Summers
Court explicitly distinguished between the seizure issue before it and
the search issue raised in Ybarra. This distinction indicates that
Ybarra's requirement of individualized probable cause must still be
satisfied where an officer would search a private premises occupant,
even though such probable cause need not be demonstrated for a
ing the law in the community's protection."' Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 95-96 (citing
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176)).
155. See, e.g., Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1989); Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis.
1992). Dissenting in Guy, Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Heffernan stated:
I do not dismiss the dangers confronting our cities' police officers. I cannot,
however, accept the majority's willingness to attribute the incidents of
violence surrounding drug transactions generally to all non-suspect individu-
als who are present at a drug raid. Despite Wisconsin's neighborhoods'
increasing entanglement in the country's drug trade, this court must remain
resolute in protecting against these "severe ... intrusion[s] upon cherished
personal security ...."
Guy, 492 N.W.2d at 320 (Heffernan, C. J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-
25).
156. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94. The Court stated: "The 'narrow scope' of the Terry
exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspi-
cion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on
premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Id. at 94.
157. See, e.g., Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 101 (stating that "[m]erely associating with a
person suspected of criminal activity does not strip away the protections of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution"). For a contrary view, see supra note 128.
158. Summers, 452 U.S. at 695. The Summers Court stated that if the detention was
permissible, "there is no need to reach the question whether a search warrant for
premises includes the right to search persons found there, because when the police
searched respondent, they had probable cause to arrest him and had done so." Id.
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seizure of the occupant. 159
Granted, as a practical matter, probable cause for searching an
occupant may often arise during the course of executing a warrant for
the search of the occupant's residence. Nonetheless, courts must be
careful not to substitute the probable cause supporting the warrant to
search the premises for the independent probable cause needed to ex-
tend the search to the occupant. To illustrate, the Beals court may have
been ultimately correct in deeming the search of that occupant lawful-
the officers had probable cause to believe the occupant had participated
in a drug sale on the premises searched. 160 Properly reasoned, how-
ever, the court's ruling would have justified the search of the
occupant's person on a ground independent of the warrant authorizing
the search of the occupant's premises.' 6'
V. PROPOSAL
The search of any person present during the execution of a search
warrant in a private residence should be held to the standards estab-
lished in Ybarra. An individual would thus be subject to search only
upon circumstances that arouse a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the individual is armed and dangerous, or that establish traditional
probable cause. Individuals should not be subject to search merely be-
cause they happen to be present where police are executing a warrant
to search a private residence.
Applying Ybarra's strictures to private premises searches will still
allow law enforcement officers to safely execute search warrants.
First, pursuant to Terry, officers may conduct a protective search for
weapons if they possess a reasonable belief that an individual to be
searched is armed and dangerous. 162 Second, under Summers, offi-
cers may detain under guard an occupant of the residence searched.'63
159. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.4. The Broadnax court stated that this Summers
footnote "suggests that while occupants of private residences may be 'seized' while a
proper search of the premises is conducted, any search of those occupants or others on
the premises must meet the standards of Ybarra." Broadnax, 654 P.2d at 103.
160. Beals, 410 So. 2d at 748-49. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
16 . As the Ybarra Court stated, the probable cause requirement "cannot be undercut
or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause
to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be."
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. But see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 4.9(e) at 306:
[Wlhen the Court in Summers says that the "risk of harm to both the police
and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation," it reflects a clearer understanding of the need for
self-protection than was manifested in the earlier case of Ybarra v. Illinois.
162. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
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If the officers discover evidence linking the occupant to criminal activ-
ity, they may at that time arrest the occupant and perform a search of
his or her person incident to the arrest." Finally, officers may choose
to remove any visitors from the premises during the search. 165 Taken
together, these measures will foster safe and constitutional searches.
In addition to ensuring safety, the limits proposed here will not
unduly frustrate law enforcement officers in their search for evidence.
To be sure, denying officers broad authority to search may ultimately
prevent them from discovering evidence which they may otherwise
find. Yet even where they impede law enforcement, the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment, as embodied in Ybarra, must be honored. 6
6
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Ybarra, law enforcement officers may not search individuals
merely because they happen to be present in a public place, or a private
one. Courts may not evade Ybarra's requirements by substituting bal-
ancing tests for Ybarra's requirement of reasonableness defined by
probable cause. Nor may they circumvent the general probable cause
requirement through an overly expansive reading of the narrow Terry
or Summers exceptions. Despite the Supreme Court's growing use of
the sliding scale test of reasonableness, for searches of individuals
present on searched premises, Fourth Amendment protection must be
preserved uniformly and without regard to the character of the place
searched.
ANGELA S. OVERGAARD
164. See supra note 81.
165. See Kiriakos, supra note 147, at 472 (stating that officers could legitimately
protect themselves by removing individuals from the place to be searched). Kiriakos
also suggests the use of the exclusionary rule to prohibit the introduction of non-
weapon evidence discovered during a Terry frisk. Id. at 464-65.
166. As Justice Stewart stated in his Summers dissent: "[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments impose significant restraints upon . . . traditional police activities, even
though the police and the courts may find those restraints unreasonably inconvenient."
Summers, 452 U.S. at 709 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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